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ABSTRACT
Power-Aware Routing in Networks. (August 2011)
Dibakar Das, B.Tech., Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee, Dr. Srinivas Shakkottai
Dr. Narasimha Reddy
The objective of this work is to develop a scheme to minimize a combination
of power consumption and congestion delay in communication networks. I model
the network as a set of parallel links, with flows that are able to divide their traffic
among the links available to them. Power consumption at each link is concave and
increasing in the load, with a non-zero intercept at the origin corresponding to idle
power consumption. I believe it is possible to minimize the overall power consumption
by possibly sharing links and shutting down the idle links, as long as it does not lead to
significant congestion in the network. In this project,I focus on developing incentives
for flows to choose the minimum cost solution. My solutions involve two elements – (i)
a mypopic and selfish controller adopted by each source, which attempts to minimize
cost seen by that flow, and (ii) a pricing scheme at each link whose objective is to
provide appropriate signals to the controllers at the source. I use ideas drawn from
population games to choose the set of source controllers, while I experiment with
using marginal costs and weighted Shapley values for the pricing scheme. I show that
the weighted Shapley value as a pricing scheme is superior to that of marginal cost
pricing in some simple cases.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
With the increasing number of networking equipments, data centers etc a significant
portion of the energy is spent only to keep these components alive. As mentioned in
[?], the power usage of the US network infrastructure is between 5 and 24 TWh/year.
There are two aspects to the power consumption in the network. The static part is
mostly independent of the work-load while the dynamic part is related to the actual
processing of work which is an increasing function of the load. Assuming that we have
the adequate hardware support to do so, it is therefore optimal to shut down a link
in an idle state. Intuitively, this suggests that in case of flows using multiple paths,
we should try to concentrate the traffic to as few links as possible. However, having
more flows sharing a single link may also lead to higher congestion which makes it
less profitable to use the link. We begin by considering the case of minimizing power
alone, without considering congestion. We will return to the congestion aspect in
Chapter VI.
The power consumption in the network is typically represented by a linearly
increasing function of the load with a non-zero intercept at origin [?]. In order to
ensure continuity at origin, we approximate it by a concave function that is zero at
origin. In particular, we use the function
C(x) = x− x
2
2
(1.1)
The journal model is IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
2which is a concave function ∀x ∈ [0, 1] and x denotes the total traffic in the link. The
optimization problem is then,
min
∑
l
C
(∑
i
xli
)
, where
∑
l
xli = xi (1.2)
Here, we have assumed no congestion, identical cost function for all links and maxi-
mum flow of 1 units, xli is the amount of flow from source i through link l.
Observation: In the solution to the above optimization problem, every
flow has non-zero distribution in exactly one link.
Proof. Let, N(i) denote the number of links that a flow (source) i can access and let
the total number of such flows be m. Let, the distribution of flows be denoted by
[x1i , x
2
i , ...x
N(i)
i ]
T = −→xi (1.3)
and the overall feasible vector by,
−→x = [−→x1T−→x2T ..−→xmT ]T (1.4)
Let us denote the corner-points of the feasible set as
{vk}, vi ∈ {×mj=1Yj : Yj ∈ {xj.Ik : N(j) ≥ k ≥ 1}} (1.5)
where Ik ∈ RN(j) is the standard unit vector that has 1 at the k-th component and
zero elsewhere. So, we see that the set of feasible solutions is given as
−→x =
∑
k
λkvk,∀λi ∈ R ≥ 0∀i,
∑
k
λk = 1, (1.6)
Clearly, the function f(−→x ) = −C(−→x ) is convex in −→x . So by convexity,
f(
∑
i
λivi) ≤
∑
i
λif(vi) ≤ maxi=1,2..Kf(vi) (1.7)
3Thus, the optimal solution lies at one of the corner-points of the feasible set, which
proves our claim.
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Fig. 1. A network structure with links arranged in a stack, with each flow having the
choice of two links.
If the network structure is as shown in Figure 1 then the optimization problem
can be converted into a minimum-weight bi-partite matching problem as shown in
Figure 2. Iterative message passing has been shown to yield a correct solution to the
above problem [?] [?].
For routing traffic to a link to be profitable, it requires two or more flows to
simultenously share the link. In Chapter III, we use potential games and replicator
dynamics and characterize the behavior of the flows in a simple 3-link scenario. We
observe that, for a large number of points in the state-space, the usual pricing scheme
fails to move traffic to the correct equilibrium. In Chapters IV and V, we use weighted-
Shapley valued pricing schemes for the links and show that this performs better in
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Fig. 2. The equivalent bi-partite graph, Nodes correspond to the flows in the network.
A link between two nodes indicate that those two flows share a common link,
0 indicates an isolated flow. The cost vector (weights) for each combination
of flows is mentioned next to each edge. The optimal solution to the k-flow
problem is the minimum weight matching.
terms of the number of states that can be routed to the correct equilibrium point.
In Chapter VI, we discuss the behavior of a general cost-function (both congestion
and power), under replicator dynamics using marginal payoffs. Chapter VII is the
conclusion.
5CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
Minimization of power consumption in the nodes through load balancing and/or sleep-
time optimization is well-studied in wireless adhoc networks [?], but this is different
from our work as the latter is suitable for slotted packet-transfer schemes. A related
work is done in [?], where the authors have proposed a distributed joint power-delay
optimization in data-centers wherein the energy-cost is a convex increasing function
in the number of data-centers and non-decreasing in load, while the delay cost is a
sum of queuing and network delay. The optimization is achieved by load-balancing
through optimal selection of loads to be routed and the number of active servers. The
idea of turning network components on or off to optimize the power consumption was
studied in [?]. However, the solution provided is neither distributed, nor does it take
the effect of congestion into account. Certain non-convex optimization schemes for
sigmoidal curves [?] involve maximising a concavo-convex utility function while our
objective is to minimize the same. In this report, we use the ideas of population games
for distribution of traffic as shown in [?], along with appropriate pricing signals to
achieve a low cost solution.
6CHAPTER III
POPULATION GAMES
In Evolutionary game theory, we have sets of population of infinitesimal players, such
that proportion of the population using a particular strategy varies over time. A
population game is defined for a set F = {1, 2, ...F} of non-atomic population of
players. Every infinitesimal member of the population i ∈ F can choose to take a
particular action si ∈ Si = {1, ...Si}, the set of strategies for the population i [?].
The population profile is then defined as the vector −→xi = {x1i , x2i , ...xSii }, such that∑Si
j=1 x
j
i = xi, that indicates the probability distribution of using those strategies
within population i. The set of all possible combinations of strategy distributions for
a specific population is denoted by Xi = {−→xi ∈ RSi+ :
∑Si
j=1 x
j
i = xi}. The state of the
system is defined as the vector
−→
X={−→x1,−→x2, ...−→xF}.
The marginal payoff obtained by members of the population i by using strategy
j, when the state of the system is X is denoted by F ji (X) ∈ R. The total payoff to the
users of population i is
∑Si
j=1 F
j
i (X)x
j
i . When the payoff function is the marginal of
a scalar cost-function that represents the energy of the system, we call it a potential
game. Thus, a potential game is a population game G with a payoff function F :
X→ RF such that there exists a continuously differentiable function T : X→ R
∂T (X)
∂xji
= F ji (X),∀i ∈ F, j ∈ Si, (3.1)
where X ∈ X is the state of the system.
In population games, a state xˆ is a Wardrop equilibrium if all the strategies being
used results in equal marginal payoff to each member, whereas the marginal payoff
that would be obtained by members is lower for all strategies not used. If Sˆ ∈ S
7denotes the set of all strategies that are being used in a Wardrop equilibrium xˆ, then:
Fi(xˆ) ≥ Fj(xˆ), ∀i ∈ Sˆ, j 6∈ Sˆ (3.2)
Fi(xˆ) = Fj(xˆ), ∀i, j ∈ Sˆ (3.3)
Replicator dynamics are typically used to route traffic from a given state X to a
Wardrop equilibrium. The dynamics, for minimizing a potential game, is given by,
x˙ji = −xji (F ji (X)−
∑Si
j=1 F
j
i x
j
i
xi
) (3.4)
At every step, the algorithm compares the fitness of a particular strategy against the
average payoff of the population. The size of the members of the population using
a “better” strategy continues to increase until it reaches an equilibrium such that
x˙ji = 0,∀i, j. Such a point is called a fixed-point corresponding to a static population
profile.
A. Modeling the problem as a routing game
We model our routing problem as a potential game G. The set of populations in
the game are the set of flows F = {1, 2, ..N}. The mass of a population is then the
rate of flow i and the profile is the distribution of this load among the set of all links
available to it .We denote it by the vector −→xi = {x1i , x2i , ....xSii }. Similarly, the set
of all states is denoted by X. Corresponding to every state-flow X, the system cost
function is denoted by C(X) and the payoff (per unit rate) in using a link j by flow
i, when the state of the system is X, is denoted by F ji (X) =
∂C(X)
∂xji
The population game is stable under replicator dynamics. The proof is similar
to one given in [?] and hence is not repeated.
Lemma: The system of flows F that use replicator dynamics is asymptotically stable.
8However, as the cost function is not convex, it is not globally asymptotically stable
and there exists multiple stable local minima other than one or more global minima.
The set of fixed points include both local maxima and minima, however the points
corresponding to the maximas are not attained under our dynamics.
B. Example
We consider the case of two source-destination flows 1 and 2 with x1 and x2 as their
respective amount of traffic (in packets/sec). The two sources use three links—1,2
and 3. Link 1 is used only by flow 1, link 3 is used solely by flow 2 while link 2 is
used by both sources ( as shown in Figure 3 ). Let, x11 and x
2
1 denote the division of
traffic x1 of flow 1, such that x
1
1 + x
2
1 = x1. Similarly, x
1
2 and x
2
2 denote the division
of traffic x2 of flow 2, into links 2 and 3 respectively, such that x
1
2 + x
2
2 = x2. The
x
1
1
x  
1
2
+ x
2
1
x
2
2
Fig. 3. Two source-destination pairs with 2 individual and one common middle link.
vector X is the state of the flows. Assuming the cost function as mentioned in the
9previous section, the total system cost is,
C(X) = (x11 −
(x11)
2
2
) + ((x21 + x
1
2)−
(x21 + x
1
2)
2
2
) + (x22 −
(x22)
2
2
) (3.5)
Therefore,
F 11 (X) =
∂C(X)
∂x11
= 1− x11 (3.6)
F 21 (X) =
∂C(X)
∂x21
= 1− (x21 + x12) (3.7)
F 12 (X) =
∂C(X)
∂x12
= 1− (x21 + x12) (3.8)
F 22 (X) =
∂C(X)
∂x22
= 1− x22. (3.9)
Both the source nodes use their knowledge of the marginal costs to change the mass in
the respective links associated with it and attempt to reach the Wardrop equilibrium,
using replicator dynamics,
x˙11 = x
1
1(
1
x1
(x11F
1
1 (X) + x
2
1F
2
1 (X))− F 11 (X)) (3.10)
x˙21 = x
2
1(
1
x1
(x11F
1
1 (X) + x
2
1F
2
1 (X))− F 21 (X)) (3.11)
x˙12 = x
1
2(
1
x2
(x12F
1
2 (X) + x
2
2F
2
2 (X))− F 12 (X)) (3.12)
x˙22 = x
2
2(
1
x2
(x12F
1
2 (X) + x
2
2F
2
2 (X))− F 22 (X)). (3.13)
At equilibrium, the rate of change of traffic should be zero and thus, equating the right
hand side of the equations (3.10)– (3.13) to zero, we obtain 8 possible Wardrop equi-
librium states (assuming x1 ≥ x2 ) :(i){0, x1, x2, 0}, (ii){x1, 0, x2, 0}, (iii){x1, 0, 0, x2},
(iv){x1+x2
2
, x1−x2
2
, x2, 0}, (v){x12 , x12 , 0, x2}, (vi){x1, 0, x22 , x22 },
(vii){0, x1, 0, x2}, (viii){x1+x23 , 2x1−x23 , 2x2−x13 , x1+x23 }. For different initial states X,
we will end up in one of the above states. Here, we have assumed that the capacity
of all the links is infinite. Case (i) is the desirable state, wherein only the middle
10
link carries the traffic of both the flows and we can turn off the two outer links. For
cases (ii)–(vii), only one of the links can be turned off. Case (viii) corresponds to the
global maximizer of the cost function. The equilibrium in Case (viii) is not possible
if x2 <
x1
2
. Then, we can have 3 possible cases, for different values of x1 and x2.
Case 1: x1 > x2 and
x1
2
≤ x2
As a specific example, we choose x1 = .3 and x2 = .2. Then every state X can be
expressed as a function of x21 and x
1
2,
X = {.3− x21, x21, x12, .2− x12}
We run the system under replicator dynamics on the entire set of possible initial
X= 0.1303
Y= 0.0243
Level= 2
x1
2
x 21
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
REGION I
REGION II
REGION
III
Fig. 4. Regions of convergence of traffic, when x1 = .3 and x2 = .2, as a function of
x21 and x
1
2. For initial states constituting Region I, the traffic is eventually
carried only through the middle link. For states lying in Region III, the traffic
is eventually carried by link 1 and 2; for states lying in Region II, the traffic
is eventually carried by the outer links 1 and 3.
11
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
x
2
1
x
1
2
Fig. 5. Contour plots of the utility function C(X),when x1 = .3 and x2 = .2, as a
function of x21 and x
1
2 . Also shown are the boundaries of the 3 regions of
convergence shown in Figure 4. Also, we show the trajectories of some states
using gradient descent instead of replicator dynamics.
states using step-sizes of 0.0001, as shown in Figure 4. In Figure 5, we plot the contour
of the utility function C(x) as a function of x21 and x
1
2. We also plot the boundary of
the three regions of convergence on this contour plot. In addition, on the same graph
we plot the trajectory of the states using gradient descent to solve the optimization
problem instead of replicator dynamics.
We made the following observations from Figure 4 and 5:
1. Out of the 8 possible Wardrop equilibria, most of the times, we reach only three
of them — {.3, 0, 0, .2}, {0, .3, .2, 0} and {.3, 0, 0.2, 0}. We can reach the other 5
equilibria points — {.15, .15, 0, .2}, {.3, 0, .1, .1}, {0, .3, 0, .2}, {.25, .05, .2, 0} and
{.1666, .133, .0333, .1666}, if and only if we start exactly at those points. Since
our objective is to minimize the cost function and replicator dynamics will
12
continue to shift traffic as long as there is a minor difference in pay-offs, for
all practical purposes, if we start with non-zero strategic distributions, we will
never reach these points. The last state {.1666, .133, .0333, .1666} is the global
maximizer of the cost function wherein the load on all the links are equal.
2. Region I correspond to the initial states for which we reach the Wardrop equilib-
rium state: {0, .3, .2, 0}. This is the most desirable outcome since this Wardrop
equilibrium is the global minimizer and we can switch off the two outer links.
For any initial state in Region III, we reach the Wardrop equilibrium {.3, 0, .2, 0}
i.e. the replicator dynamics transfer all the traffic from the flow with lesser rate
to the middle link while transferring all the traffic from the other flow to its
outer link. For states in Region II, the entire flow is eventually carried only
in the outer two links. We notice, that since the cost function is identical for
all links, the last two Wardrop equilibriums result in the same overall cost and
shutting down of one link.
3. For initial states where the load in middle link is greater than the load in both
the outer two links, the pay-off in using the middle link is always lower than
the pay-off in using the outer links and the dynamics is guaranteed to transfer
traffic from the outer links to the middle link. That is, the sufficient conditions
for the initial states to converge to the equilibrium {0, .3, .2, 0} are given by :
2x21 + x
1
2 ≥ .3 (3.14)
2x12 + x
2
1 ≥ .2 (3.15)
In Figure 4, the above conditions refer to the region to the right of the two
straight lines. This region is a subset of the actual set of states converging to
the same equilibrium point.
13
4. The curves indicating the boundary between Region I and II, Region II and III,
Region I and III all intersect at one and only one point, {.1667, .133, .0333, .1667},
which is the maximizing Wardrop equilibrium.
5. Assuming all the feasible initial states are equally likely, the probability of
converging to the global optimum is, Probability ( Initial state in Region I)
=
area of Region I
total area of states
In general for any x1 and x2 such that, x1 ≥ x2 and x12 ≤ x2, the lower bound
to the probability of converging to the global optimum is ,
P ≥ 5
6
− 1
12
(
x2
x1
+
x1
x2
)
≥ 5
6
− 1
12
(
5
2
)
=
15
24
.
6. As can be seen from Figure 5 the boundary between Region I and Region
III is the locus of points obtained by moving along the gradient of the cost
function from the singular Wardrop equilibrium {.25, .05, .2, 0} to the maxi-
mizing equilibrium {.1667, .133, .0333, .1667}. Similarly, the boundary between
Region I and Region II and Region II and Region III are obtained by mov-
ing against the gradient from the ‘disjoint’ Wardrop equilibrium {.15, .15, 0, .2}
to {.1667, .133, .0333, .1667} and {0.3, 0, 0.1, .1} to {.1667, .133, .0333, .1667} re-
spectively.
7. Again from Figure 5, it can be seen that the gradient descent algorithm moves
the traffic to the same final equilibrium states as replicator dynamics. However,
the trajectories for the convergence are not same for both.
14
Case 2: x1 = x2
x
1
2
X= 0.0267
Y= 0.0268
Level= 0.19033
x 21
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Fig. 6. Regions of convergence of traffic, when x1 = .1and x2 = .1, as a function of
x21 and x
1
2. For initial states constituting Region I, the traffic is eventually
carried only through the middle link. For states lying in Region II, the traffic
is eventually carried by links 1 and 3; for states lying in Region III, and IV
the traffic is eventually carried by one outer link and one middle link.
In particular, we choose x1 = x2 = .1 ( Figure 6 ). There are 7 possible Wardrop
equilibrium states (since 2 states merge to 2 other states). Out of these- states
{.05, .05, 0, .1},
{0.1, 0, .05, .05}, {.0666, .0333, .0333, .0666} are once again singular points and are
never reached with ideal replicator dynamics.Region III is the region of convergence
for the Wardrop equilibrium state {0, .1, 0, .1}. Similarly Region IV is the region of
convergence for the Wardrop equilibrium {.1, 0, .1, 0}. However, we notice that both
these regions consist entirely of points wherein either x21 or x
1
2 is 0. So, if we start
with non-zero strategy distributions, with ideal replicator dynamics, we will never
end up in the Wardrop states {.1, 0, .1, 0} and {0, .1, 0, .1}. Region II and Region I
15
are same as before.
The lower bound on the probability of convergence to the global optimum in this
case is given by,
P ≥ 0.667
Case 3: x1
2
≥ x2
X= 0.1007
Y= 0.0395
Level= 4
x
1
2
x 21
0 0.05 0.1 0.15
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
Region I
Region II
Region III
Fig. 7. Regions of convergence of traffic, when x1 = .15 and x2 = .05, as a function
of x21 and x
1
2. For initial states constituting Region I, the traffic is eventually
carried only through the middle link. For states lying in Region II, the traffic
is eventually carried by links 1 and 3; for states lying in Region III, the traffic
is eventually carried by one outer link and one middle link.
We choose x1 = .15 and x2 = .05 for our simulations ( Figure 7 ). Once again,
there are three regions with the Region I corresponding to the Wardrop equilibrium
with two outer links shut down, Region II corresponding to the two outer links being
on and Region III corresponding to one inner link and on middle link being on.
However, we notice that the sufficient condition for convergence to the middle link
16
now is,
2x21 + x
1
2 ≥ .15 (3.16)
Accordingly, the boundary between Region I and Region II, and the boundary be-
tween Region II and Region III touch each other at the point (.075, 0). The lower
bound on the probability of convergence to the global optimum in this case is given
by,
P ≥ 1
2
+
1
4
x2
x1
(3.17)
Also, if x2  x1, then
P ≈ 1
2
and the lower bound approach the exact bound. Thus, we see that even in worst
case, the fraction of the state-space in the three-link two-flow case that converges to
the desired equilibrium state is at least 1
2
. In the next section, we seek to obtain an
exact expression for the boundary between the different regions of convergence.
C. Approximate mathematical representation of the boundary curves
The boundary between the two regions can be obtained by using the fact that the
replicator dynamics lead to the same equilibrium states as gradient descent. There-
fore, using gradient descent method to minimize the cost function, the rate of change
of the load in the middle link, assuming infinitesimal and equal step-size, is given by,
∂x21
∂t
= −{1− (x21 + x12)}+ {1− (x1 − x21)} = 2x21 + x12 − x1 (3.18)
∂x12
∂t
= −{1− (x21 + x12)}+ {1− (x2 − x12)} = 2x12 + x21 − x2, (3.19)
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where x1 and x2 are the total throughput of the two flows. We can represent the
above equation as ,
y˙ = Ay − g, (3.20)
where y =
x21
x12
, A =
2 1
1 2
, g =
x1
x2
. We can diagonalize the matrix A
as, D = X−1AX, where D is a diagonal matrix of eigen values of A, and columns
of X are the corresponding eigen-vectors. In our case, we have D =
3 0
0 1
,X =
 1√2 1√2
1√
2
− 1√
2
 .
Multiplying both sides by X−1, and denoting X−1y by z, −X−1g by g′, we get z′ =
Dz + g′. Now, this differential equation pair can be solved as,
z1(t) = r1e
3t − c
′
1
3
(3.21)
z2(t) = r2e
t − c′2, (3.22)
where z1(t) and z2(t) are design parameters and g
′ =
c′1
c′2
. Therefore,
x21(t) =
1√
2
(r1e
3t − c
′
1
3
+ r2e
t − c′2) (3.23)
x12(t) =
1√
2
(r1e
3t − c
′
1
3
− r2et + c′2) (3.24)
When t = 0, we have ,x21(0)
x12(0)
 =
 1√2 1√2
1√
2
− 1√
2

r1
r2
− 1√
2
 c′13 + c′2
c′1
3
− c′2
 (3.25)
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Therefore, r1
r2
 =
 1√2 1√2
1√
2
− 1√
2


x21(0)
x12(0)
+ 1√
2
 c′13 + c′2
c′1
3
− c′2

 . (3.26)
Equations (3.23), (3.24) and (3.26) completely define the locus of the points (x21,x
1
2)
under the given dynamics and initial conditions. Repeating the above process for
gradient ascent, we obtain the following equations:
x21(t) =
1√
2
(r1e
−3t − c
′
1
3
+ r2e
−t − c′2) (3.27)
x12(t) =
1√
2
(r1e
−3t − c
′
1
3
− r2e−t + c′2). (3.28)
and r1
r2
 =
 1√2 1√2
1√
2
− 1√
2


x21(0)
x12(0)
+ 1√
2
 c′13 + c′2
c′1
3
− c′2

 (3.29)
The boundary between the different regions are then the trajectory of the points
obtained by gradient ascent with the points corresponding to the local maxima as
the initial starting point. For example- in our first example where x1 = .3, x2 = .2,
the boundary of the three regions of convergence can be obtained as the trajectory
of points under gradient ascent from initial states- {0.15, 0.15, 0, 2}, {0.25, 0.05, .2, 0}
and{0.3, 0, .1, .1}
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CHAPTER IV
ROUTING USING WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES FOR THE THREE LINK
PROBLEM
In Game-theory, Shapley value was designed to evaluate the contribution of each
individual member in a given coalition and thus attempt a fairer allocation of the net
profit between the individual members.
Let’s assume we have a coalition S of n members. We define a characteristic function
U(S) : 2n → R:
U(φ) = 0, (4.1)
U(A ∪B) ≥ U(A) + U(B) (4.2)
where A and B are two disjoint coalitions. The above relations mean that the net-
worth of a coalition between two disjoint coalitions is more than the sum of the two
independent coalitions. Also, the net-worth of any coalition is the same independent
of the way in which the coalition is formed. The allocation function ψ : U(S) → Rn
is then defined as,
ψ(U) = {ψ1(U), ψ2(U), ...ψn(U)} (4.3)
Thus, the function returns the weights, called Shapley weights ψi(U), for each member
i given the overall utility function U(S). Also, the sum of all ψi(U) should be equal
to the total utility U(S).
The Shapley weights reflect the contribution of each participating member in
the coalition. Due to property (4.2), every participating member renders a positive
contribution to the coalition, the value of the coalition S with the new member minus
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that of the sole coalition S, i.e.
P (i, S) = U(S ∪ {i})− U(S). (4.4)
Now, with a set F of n members, the total number of possible combinations consisting
of s members is (
n
s
)
. (4.5)
Also, the profit is shared equally among all members. So, we have our final weight
factor:
q =
1
(s+ 1)
(
n
s
) (4.6)
The Shapley weight for a member i is therefore,
ψi(U) =
∑
S⊂F
qp(i, s) (4.7)
Next, we discuss the application of Shapley value to our routing problem.
We again consider the case of a link shared by 2 flows indexed 1 and 2 with
flow-rates x1 and x2 respectively. If C(y) denotes the cost (negative utility) of using a
link when the total load flowing through it is y, then the weight factor q for each flow
is simply 1
2
(since, there are only 2 possible ways in which flow 1 can form a coalition
with flow 2 and vice versa). The overall Shapley-weight for flow 1 and 2 in this link
is therefore,
ψ1(C(x+ y)) =
1
2
(C(x) + C(x+ y)− C(y)) (4.8)
ψ2(C(x+ y)) =
1
2
(C(y) + C(x+ y)− C(x)). (4.9)
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Since we are interested in per-unit cost, therefore, the costs are: 1
2x
(C(x) +C(x+ y)−
C(y)) and 1
2y
(C(y) + C(x + y) − C(x)) for flow 1 and 2 respectively. For links that
have only a single flow, the per-unit price is simply the average per-unit cost, C(x)
x
for
a flow of rate x.
A. Weighted Shapley value
Instead of using constant Shapley weights of 1
2
, we consider the use of Shapley value
of different weights such that the net-worth of the coalition still remains the same
as before and is equal to the total cost of using that link. The motivation behind
using a weight different from 1
2
is that the weights of 1
2
essentially correspond to the
same dynamics as obtained using marginals. On the other hand, using different initial
weights, we can control the dynamics of the state and possibly tweak it to route to a
desired equilibrium point, if feasible. We use constant weights, i.e., every initial state
corresponds to a single set of weights which remains unchanged throughout the rest
of the dynamics.
Thus, in our 2-flow single-link, the overall Shapley weights are now:
ψ1,w(C(x+ y)) = (w2C(x) + w1(C(x+ y)− C(y))) (4.10)
ψ2,w(C(x+ y)) = (w1C(y) + w2(C(x+ y)− C(x))) (4.11)
w1 + w2 = 1, w1, w2 ≥ 0. (4.12)
It is easy to see that the net worth of the coalition is still the sum of the 2 individual
Shapley-weights
ψ1,w(C(x+ y)) + ψ2,w(C(x+ y)) = C(x+ y) (4.13)
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Accordingly, the per-unit prices are therefore, 1
x
((w2C(x) +w1(C(x+ y)−C(y))) and
1
y
((w1C(y) +w2(C(x+ y)−C(x))) respectively. The per-unit price of the flow in the
single-link remains unchanged at C(x)
x
. Next we discuss in detail the effect of using
pricing based on Shapley-valued weights on our previous 3-link problem.
Using C(x) = x − x2
2
, the vector of prices (negative payoffs) obtained for the 3-link
problem is now given by,
F 11 (X) = (1−
x11
2
) (4.14)
F 21 (X) = (1−
x21
2
)− x12w1 (4.15)
F 12 (X) = (1−
x12
2
)− x21w2 (4.16)
F 22 (X) = (1−
x22
2
) (4.17)
x11 + x
2
1 = x1, x
1
2 + x
2
2 = x2, w1 + w2 = 1, w1, w2 ≥ 0, (4.18)
where X = [x11, x
2
1, x
1
2, x
2
2] denotes the current state of the system.
As a result, the sufficient conditions to route traffic corresponding to flow 1 from
the link 1 to the middle link is given by,
F 11 (X)− F 21 (X) ≥ 0 (4.19)
i.e. w1x
1
2 + x
2
1 ≥
x1
2
. (4.20)
Similarly, the sufficient condition to route traffic from link 3 to link 2 is
w2x
2
1 + x
1
2 ≥
x2
2
. (4.21)
Q: Find the set of sufficient conditions on x21 and x
1
2 such that ∃w1 ∈ [0, 1] ,
which satisfies (4.20) and (4.21)
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A: From (4.20), we get
w1x
1
2 >
x1
2
− x21
⇒ w1 >
(x1
2
− x21)
x12
Along with 0 ≤ w1 ≤ 1, we get
max{0, (
x1
2
− x21)
x12
} ≤ w1 (4.22)
Similarly, from (4.21), we get,
w2 ≥
(x2
2
− x12)
x21
⇒ (1− w1) ≥
(x2
2
− x12)
x21
⇒ w1 ≤ 1−
(x2
2
− x12)
x21
⇒ w1 ≤ 1 +
(−x2
2
+ x12)
x21
So, we get the upper bound on w1 as ,
w1 ≤ min{1, 1 +
(−x2
2
+ x12)
x21
} (4.23)
Therefore, the overall condition on w1 is,
max{0, (
x1
2
− x21)
x12
} ≤ w1
≤ min{1, 1 + (−
x2
2
+x12)
x21
} (4.24)
Now,
max{0, (
x1
2
− x21)
x12
} =
 0 if x1 < 2x
2
1
(
x1
2
−x21)
x12
else
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and
min{1, 1 + (−
x2
2
+ x12)
x21
} =
 1 if x2 < 2x
1
2
1 +
(−x2
2
+x12)
x21
else
Thus, we have 4 possible cases:
Case A: x21 ≥ x12 , x12 ≥ x22
We have 0 ≤ 1, which is satisfied for any value of x21 and x12 in the given range.
Case B: x21 ≥ x12 , x12 ≤ x22
We have
0 ≤ 1 + (−
x2
2
+ x12)
x21
(4.25)
⇒ x21 + x12 ≥
x2
2
(4.26)
Case C: x21 ≤ x12 , x12 ≥ x22
We have
(x1
2
− x21)
x12
≤ 1 (4.27)
⇒ x1
2
≤ x12 + x21 (4.28)
Case D: x21 ≤ x12 , x12 ≤ x22
We have
(x1
2
− x21)
x12
≤ 1 + (−
x2
2
+ x12)
x21
(4.29)
⇒ (x21 − α1(x12))(x21 − α2(x12)) ≥ 0, (4.30)
where α1(x
1
2) =
−(x12−x12 )−
√
(x12−x12 )2−4(x12
2−x12 x22 )
2
and α2(x
1
2) =
−(x12−x12 )+
√
(x12−x12 )2−4(x12
2−x12 x22 )
2
. As, x12 ≤ x22 , we have α1(x12) ≥ 0 and α2(x12) ≥ 0.
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Therefore, the only possible solutions are x21 such that,
x1
2
≥ x21 ≥ α2(x12), x12 ∈ [0,
x2
2
] (4.31)
We notice that for the choice of weights w1 = w2 = .5, the set of states in the state-
space that converges to the optimal solution is the same as the one obtained using the
marginal approach. On the other hand, varying the weights between 0 and 1 allows
us to route additional states to the optimal equilibrium. Thus, we observe that the
Shapley value approach performs better than the marginal approach. Also, given any
initial state, we can numerically find, if possible, an appropriate weight that would
make it go to the optimal state.
Since the gradient descent for a given weight vector lead to the same results as
replicator dynamics, therefore,
∂x21
∂t
= (w1x
1
2 + x
2
1 −
x1
2
) (4.32)
∂x12
∂t
= (w2x
2
1 + x
1
2 −
x2
2
) (4.33)
Again, we can re-write the given systems of equations as,
y˙ = Ay − g, (4.34)
where y =
x21
x12
,A =
 1 w1
w2 1
, g =
x12
x2
2
. Again, We can diagonalize the matrix
A as, D = X−1AX, where D is a diagonal matrix of eigen values of A and the columns
of X are the corresponding eigen-vectors. The eigen vector matrix X is a function of
w1. Multiplying both sides by X
−1 and denoting X−1y by z, −X−1g by g′, we get
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z′ = Dz + g′ which once again can be solved as,
z1(t) = r1e
λ1t − c
′
1
λ1
(4.35)
z2(t) = r2e
λ2t − c
′
2
λ2
(4.36)
where g′ =
c′1
c′2
. Also,
x21(t)
x12(t)
 = X
z1(t)
z2(t)
 and
r1
r2
 =
 c′1λ1
c′2
λ2
+X−1

x21(0)
x12(0)

 . (4.37)
Also repeating the above for gradient ascent,
(z2(t) +
c′2
λ2
)
1
r2
= e−λ2t
= (e−λ1t)
λ2
λ1
= ((z1(t) +
c′1
λ1
)
1
r1
)
λ2
λ1
Lets denote X−1(w1) =
v11 v21
v12 v
2
2
. Then, we get the equation of the curve repre-
senting the trajectory of a given point under gradient ascent by replacing the values
of z2 and z1 as,
(v12x
2
1 + v
2
2x
1
2 +
c′2
λ2
)
1
r2
= ((v11x
2
1 + v
2
1x
1
2 +
c′1
λ1
)
1
r1
)
λ2
λ1
Again, the boundaries of the regions of convergence are the trajectories of the points
obtained using gradient ascent method starting from a local maxima.
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In general, for a given x1 and x2, and a given weight w1, there can be 4 possible
combinations of local maxima that exists. Hence there are 4 possible sets of regions
of convergence maps, as described below. Again, we assume, x1 ≥ x2.
Case 1:
x1
2
− w1x2 ≥ 0
x2
2
− w2x1 ≤ 0
The global maxima is once again the point of intersection of the lines: (w1x
1
2 + x
2
1 −
x1
2
x 21
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Region I
Region II
Region
III
Fig. 8. Case1a:x1 = .3, x2 = .2, Shapley weight w1 = .5. For initial states constituting
Region I, the final equilibrium state is (.3,.2), for Region II :(0,0), for Region
III, the final equilibrium state is (0,.2). Note, the graph is same as the one
obtained using marginal pay-offs.
x1
2
) = 0 and (w2x
2
1 + x
1
2 − x22 ) = 0. Since x1 ≥ x2, it can be shown that the point
of intersection lies within the feasible state-space if (x2
2
− x1w22 ) ≥ 0. Suppose that,
this is true. Then the local maxima points that determine the boundary are now:
(x1
2
− w1x2, x2), (0, x22 ), (x12 , 0). The feasible equilibrium points are (0, 0), (x1, x2) and
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(0, x2). The boundary of the region are determined by the trajectories of the points
starting from the given local maxima points (Figure 8).
If the ordinate of the point of global maxima is below zero, then we have 3
possible equilibrium states (Figure 9), but the boundary points are determined by
just 2 local points within the feasible state-space: (x1
2
− w1x2, x2), (0, x22 ).
Case 2:
X= 0.045
Y= 0.048
Level= 1
x1
2
x 21
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Region I
Region III
Region II
Fig. 9. Case1b:x1 = .3, x2 = .2, Shapley weight w1 = .2. For initial states constituting
Region I, the final equilibrium state is (.3,.2), for Region II :(0,0), for Region
III, the final equilibrium state is (0,.2). The intersection of the straight-lines
representing the sufficient conditions for a given w1 is outside the state-space
and thus, we have only two boundary curves.
x1
2
− w1x2 ≥ 0
x2
2
− w2x1 ≥ 0
Now, we have possible regions of convergence determined by the local maxima points:
(x1
2
−w1x2, x2), (0, x22 ), (x12 , 0), (x1, x22 −w2x1). The stable equilibrium points possible
are (0, 0), (x1, 0), (0, x2), (x1, x2) (Figure 10).
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X= 0.181
Y= 0.008
Level= 4
x1
2
x 21
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Region
II
Region IV
Region
III Region I
Fig. 10. Case2:x1 = .3, x2 = .2, Shapley weight w1 = .7. For initial states constituting
Region I, the final equilibrium state is (.3,.2), for Region II:(0,0), for Region
III: (0,.2), for Region IV: (.3,0).
Case 3:
x1
2
− w1x2 ≤ 0
x2
2
− w2x1 ≥ 0
We have 3 regions corresponding to equilibrium points: (0, 0), (x1, 0) and (x1, x2).
The region corresponding to the equilibrium point (0, x2) is eliminated as for the given
choice of weights, this is an unstable equilibrium (Figure 11).
Case 4:
x1
2
− w1x2 ≤ 0
x2
2
− w2x1 ≤ 0
So, w1 ≥ x1
2x2
and
w2 ≥ x2
2x1
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x1
2
x 21
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
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0.18
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Region II Region III
Fig. 11. Case3:x1 = .3, x2 = .2, Shapley weight w1 = .9. For initial states constituting
Region I, the final equilibrium state is (.3,.2), for Region II:(0,0), for Region
III: (.3,0).
The only possible solution to the above set of inequalities is x1 = x2 and w1 = w2 = .5.
Since, this is same as the curve obtained in the marginal case of x1 = x2 = .1, the
graph is not repeated. We have 2 equilibrium stable points (0, 0) and (x1, x2). The
boundary is determined by the trajectories from the local maxima: (0, x1
2
) and (x1
2
, 0).
We make the following observations:
1. When x1
2
≥ x2, then there is no possible weight that will eliminate the region
corresponding to the undesirable equilibrium state (0, x2). Otherwise, there
exist weights such that all the points in the feasible state-space goes to either
(0, 0) or the desirable (x1, x2).
2. The union of all desirable regions as weight w1 is varied between 0 and 1 gives
the set of points for which there exists a set of weights that can route the traffic
to the optimal equilibrium as shown in Figure 12.
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X= 0.073
Y= 0.045
Level= 0.855
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
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0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
x
1
2
x
1 2
Fig. 12. With x1 = .3, x2 = .2, the regions for which there exists Shapley weights for
which the initial state can be directed to (0.3,0.2) is indicated by the grey
area, the area shaded green indicates points for which no such weight can be
found.
3. w1 = w2 =
1
2
corresponds to the replicator dynamics using marginal pay-offs.
Thus, we claim that using the Shapley valued scheme, the region of state-space
that converges to the desirable equilibrium point (x1, x2) is at least as large
as the one obtained using marginals. Conversely, given a point (x21, x
1
2), the
possible weights can be found as follows. We vary the weight w1 between 0 and
1. For a given w1, we compute the set of feasible local maximas and hence the
equation of the curves corresponding to the feasible boundaries of the regions
of convergence, which are polynomials in (w1, x
2
1, x
1
2). If the given point lies to
the right and above the relevant boundary curves corresponding to one of the 4
cases as mentioned previously, we set that w1 as our Shapley weight. Otherwise,
we increase w1. If w1 = 1, then there exists no such weight for which the point
can be routed to the desired equilibrium point.
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CHAPTER V
SHAPLEY VALUE IN GENERAL STRUCTURES
Let us consider a simple 4-flow 5-link example. Let, the links be denoted as li,
x
x
x
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x
x
x4
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Fig. 13. 4 flows with 5 links using Shapley value.
1 ≤ i ≤ 5, and the flows be x1, x2, x3, x4 as shown in Figure 13. Also, from top to
bottom, the contribution of flow i to the first link that it shares is denoted by x1i and
the one in the other link is denoted by x2i . Let, the weight vectors in each link be the
same as shown in the figure. We notice that, w11 = 1, w
2
1 = 0,w
1
5 = 1, w
2
5 = 0, since
there is only one flow possible in these two “boundary links”. Also, as usual,
w1i + w
2
i = 1, w
j
i ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 5, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2 (5.1)
Now for this case, we can have only 2 possible optimum equilibriums, depending on
whether (5.2) is satisfied or not:
1. Load (x1 + x2) flowing in link l2 and (x3 + x4) flowing in link l4.
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2. Load (x2 + x3) in link l3 and x1 in either link l1 or l2 and x4 in either link l4 or l5.
Now if the optimal equilibrium is indeed the same as in Case 1 above, then
(x1 + x2)− (x1 + x2)
2
2
+
(x3 + x4)− (x3 + x4)
2
2
≤ x1 − x
2
1
2
+ (x2 + x3)
−(x2 + x3)
2
2
+ x4 − x
2
4
2
⇒ −2x1x2
2
− 2x3x4
2
≤ −2x2x3
2
⇒ x1x2 + x3x4 ≥ x2x3. (5.2)
On the other hand, when, x1x2 + x3x4 ≤ x2x3, the optimal equilibrium is the same
as the one in second of the above-mentioned cases.
We consider Case 1. From (4.20) and (4.21), we see that the sufficient conditions to
obtain the desired equilibrium are,
(1− x
1
1
2
) ≥ 1− x
2
1
2
− w12x12 (5.3)
(1− x
1
2
2
− w22x21) ≤ 1−
x22
2
− w13x13 (5.4)
(1− x
1
3
2
− w23x22) ≥ 1−
x23
2
− w14x14 (5.5)
(1− x
1
4
2
− w24x23) ≤ 1−
x24
2
. (5.6)
Now, we assume that initially, all the flows have equal contribution in each of the two
links that it can use, i.e. x1i = x
2
i =
xi
2
. Therefore from equation 5.3, we get
(1− x1
4
) ≥ 1− x1
4
− w12
x2
2
(5.7)
⇒ w12 ≥ 0 (5.8)
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Similarly, 5.4 give,
−w22x1 ≤ −w13x3 (5.9)
i.e. w22x1 ≥ w13x3 (5.10)
Thus, the required sets of sufficient conditions are:
w12 ≥ 0 (5.11)
w22x1 ≥ w13x3 (5.12)
w23x2 ≤ w14x4 (5.13)
w24 ≥ 0 (5.14)
We choose w12, w
2
4 =  ' 0.
Therefore, w22 = w
1
4 ' 1.
Therefore, the required conditions are now
x1 ≥ w13x3 (5.15)
x4 ≥ w23x2 (5.16)
Now, given x1x2 + x3x4 ≥ x2x3, we have, x1x2 + x3x4 = Kx2x3, where K ≥ 1.
Therefore, x1x2 = Krx2x3 and x3x4 = K(1− r)x2x3, where 1 ≥ r ≥ 0.
So, x1 = Krx3. Therefore, x1 ≥ rx3 (since K ≥ 1 ). Similarly, x4 ≥ (1− r)x2.
Taking w13=r and w
2
3 = (1− r), we see that there exists weights (w13, w23) that satisfies
equation 5.15 and 5.16. Therefore, for this 4-flow problem, given that initially all
flows have equal loads in their associated links and the optimal solution is Case 1, we
can find weights that will lead to the optimal solution.
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Case 2: The sufficient conditions are as follows:
w23x2 ≥ w14x4, and (5.17)
w13x3 ≥ w22x1 (5.18)
Since, we do not care about the flows x1 and x4 (as they would concentrate to a single
link, regardless of the choice of weights. This happens because the only possible stable
equilibrium for these two links are one in which their entire load is in a single link),
therefore, we can choose w14, w
2
2 ' 0. For such a choice, any set of positive real
numbers that sum to 1 would satisfy the equations 5.17 and 5.18. Thus, we see that
once again there exist set of weights that concentrate the traffic flows to the optimal
condition, given this specific initial condition.
Now, let us consider the following case. Assume that the desired state is as shown in
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Fig. 14. Equilibrium in which a flow is not sharing a link with either of its neighboring
flows.
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the Figure 14. Then, we see that setting w24 = 0 and w
1
3 = 0 is sufficient for flow x4
and x2 to re-direct traffic from l4 to l5 and l3 to l2 respectively.
In general, we can remark that if the desired equilibrium state, given this specific
initial condition of “half-load”, consists of such an isolated flow, then the weights
corresponding to this flow can simply be chosen to be 0.
Observation: Given the initial state as mentioned before, i.e. all flows have
equal loads in each of the two links that it can access, and the network
structure is of k-flows with 2 links each and arranged in a stack, there exists
a set of Shapley values that can re-direct traffic to the optimal state.
Proof. :Consider the following structure, the k (k is even)-flows and the corresponding
weights in each of the (k + 1) links are shown in the Figure 15. The desired optimal
state is such that every successive pair of flows is using only their common links. The
sufficient conditions are given as, w12, w
2
k ' 0, w22 ' 1, x1 ≥ w13x3,
w14x4 ≥ w23x2, w24x3 ≥ w15x5, ... w1kxk ≥ w2k−1xk−2 Now, we adopt a conservative
approach to select the weights. Starting from the top, w12 can be chosen close to zero,
therefore w22 ' 1. Selecting w13 ' min{1, x1x3}, ensures that w13x3 ≤ x1. Now there are
two possible cases:
Case 1. If w13 = 1, w
2
3 = 0. So, w
1
4 = 0and w
2
4 = 1. We select, w
1
5 = min{1, x3x5}.
Again, if w15 = 1, w
2
5 = 0. Therefore, we can select w
1
6 ' 0, so w26 ' 1 and so on.
If w15 =
x3
x5
, 0 ≤ w25 = (1− x3x5 ) ≤ 1.
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Fig. 15. k-flows with (k+1) links.
Now,
w25x4 = (1−
x3
x5
)x4 (5.19)
=
(x5 − x3)x4
x5
(5.20)
=
x5x4 − x3x4
x5
(5.21)
≤ x5x6
x5
(since x5x6 + x3x4 ≥ x5x4) (5.22)
≤ x6 (5.23)
So, there exists 0 ≤ w16 ≤ 1, s.t w16x6 ≥ w25x4. This process is repeated in every
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successive link and at n-th link, we obtain 0 ≤ w1n, w2n ≤ 1, such that the sufficient
conditions till that step are satisfied.
Case 2. Similarly, if w13 =
x1
x3
, then 0 ≤ w23 = (1− x1x3 ) ≤ 1.
Since, x1x2 + x3x4 ≥ x2x3, (required for optimality), therefore, it can be shown that
w23x2 ≤ x4.
Therefore, there exists 0 ≤ w14 ≤ 1 such that, w14x4 ≥ w23x2 and 0 ≤ w24 ≤ 1. Again,
this sequence is repeated.
Thus, in a stretch of links such that every alternate link is occupied by two
flows in the optimal solution, it is possible to reach those states using suitably chosen
Shapley values. Also, from our previous discussion, we note that if the optimal
state consists of a few isolated flows (i.e. ones which do not share their occupied
link with any other flow), then we can select their corresponding Shapley weights
to zero to eliminate their influence on the neighboring flows and thus separate the
desirable states to continuous independent blocks of links sharing flows with neighbors
separated by the isolated flows. Thus, given the optimal state and the given equal-load
initial condition, it is possible to reach the optimal equilibrium using the appropriate
Shapley values.
As expected, even the “half-half” initial state does not always lead to the correct
solution using marginals. eg-for a 4-flow case with x1 = .144, x2 = .48, x3 = .6, x4 =
.5, the equilibrium reached using marginals is [0, .144, 0, .48, 0, .6, .5, 0], while with
weights {.01, .99, .2, .8, .01, .99}, we can reach the desired equilibrium:
[0, .144, .48, 0, 0, .6, .5, 0]. The above observation suggests that in such cases of general
links, Shapley valued pricing can perform better than marginal payoffs.
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CHAPTER VI
SYSTEM WITH DELAY
We consider a delay function of form
Kx
(1− x) , (6.1)
where K is a scalar constant. So, the overall cost function is
F (x) = (x− x
2
2
) +
Kx
(1− x) , (6.2)
and the corresponding marginal cost function (Figure 16) is
f(x) = 1− x+ K
(1− x)2 . (6.3)
Observation: The function F(x) is convex for K ≥ .5
Proof. The function F(x) is convex if the second derivative ∂
2F
∂x2
≥ 0,∀x ∈ (0, 1) , i.e
1 ≤ 2K
(1− x)3 (6.4)
⇒ (1− x)3 ≤ 2K (6.5)
⇒ 1− (2K) 13 ≤ x (6.6)
⇒ K ≥ 1
2
(6.7)
The point x0 = 1− (2K) 13 , is the minimizer of the marginal cost function f(x).
The constant K is chosen, such that:
a) x0 is greater than .5,
b) The magnitude of the slope of the marginal cost curve is higher for x above x0
than those below it.
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The non-zero value of x such that f(x) = f(0),0 < x ≤ 1 is denoted by xcr.
xcr(K) = 1− K
2
− 2
√
(
K2
4
) +K (6.8)
For our choice of K=0.01, the optimal solution for the previous 3-link 2-flow problem
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
marginal cost function, K=.005
x
f(x
)
Fig. 16. Marginal cost function with K=.005.
consists of using a single link as long as the total load x1 + x2 ≤ xcr;to use two links
when the load xcr ≤ x1 + x2 ≤ 2xcr and to use three links for all loads greater than
2xcr. When, K=0.01, x0 = .7286 and xcr = .8949.
Claim: In the three link problem, all links are operational only when at
least 2 links have loads higher than x0, with fixed K.
Proof. We denote the load values that are greater than x0 by xh and the lower ones
by xl. For certain range of xh, it is possible to find a corresponding xl having the
same marginal cost. For such a pair, let a = −1 + 2K
(1−xl)3 and b = −1 + 2K(1−xh)3 .
Clearly, a < 0 and b > 0. Let the matrix A denote the Hessian matrix of the total
system cost C(X) at equilibrium. We can have three possible scenarios:
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a) All links have load lower than xl. In this case, the state vector can be written as
[xl, xl1, xl2, xl] where xl1 + xl2 = xl. In this case, for a feasible displacement vector
d = [,−, 0, 0], we see that dTAd < 0, implying that this is not a stable equilibrium
point. In fact it is a global maxima as all links with concave utility have equal load.
b) Only one link has load greater than x0. In this case again, taking a displacement
vector d = [,−, ,−], we find that the equilibrium point is unstable.
c)Lets take the case of two links having loads greater than x0 and one having load
xl. Let the load vector be [xl, xh1, xh2, xh], where xh1 + xh2 = xh. In this case taking
a general displacement vector d = [1,−1, 2,−2],
dTAd = a21 + b12 + b(1 − 2)2 (6.9)
≥ 0, if |b| > 4|a|
3
(6.10)
For our choice of K=0.01, we can find a set of points xh and xl that satisfies the
criteria: |b| > 4|a|
3
. Hence, there exists a stable equilibrium.
Next, we repeat our previous simulations for the three link case using this new
cost function. We have three possible cases:
A. x1 + x2 ≤ xcr
In particular, we take x1 = .3, x2 = .2. The resultant plot is shown in Figure 17. The
results in this case are similar to the corresponding case when the cost function did
not involve any delay element.
B. xcr ≤ x1 + x2 ≤ 2xcr
In particular, we take x1 = .7 and x2 = .6. The resultant plot is shown in Figure 18.
The optimal distribution is one in which there are two links active with equal
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Fig. 17. Regions of convergence of traffic, when x1 = .3 and x2 = .2, as a function of x
2
1
and x12.The regions are same as for the corresponding case without considering
delays.
marginal cost, i.e with loads .8471 and .453. We see that in addition to our regular
equilibrium points with zero load on the middle or “smaller” link, we have other
possible distribution of loads. For low loads x21 and x
1
2 on the middle link, the final
equilibrium point is [0.7, 0, 0, 0.6] . When x21 is small, but x
1
2 is high, we have an-
other possible equilibrium [0.7, 0, 0.6, 0]. For high x21 and low x
1
2, we have the desired
equilibrium [0, .7, .1471, .453] where the marginal costs corresponding to the loads in
one middle link and an outer link balances each other. Similarly, we have another
possible equilibrium when x21 is relatively small and x
1
2 is high. The corresponding
load vector [.453, .2471, .6, 0] has loads in the first two links with the third link being
shut off. We notice that, the equilibrium points have at most 1 link operating with
load lower than x0. The optimal solution are [0, .7, .1471, .453] and [.453, .2471, .6, 0]
However, there are other scenarios, for higher values of x1 +x2, when we have a third
link turned on, even though it is not optimal to do so. For example- when x1 =
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Fig. 18. Regions of convergence of traffic, when x1 = .7 and x2 = .6, as a function of
x21 and x
1
2.
.9, x2 = .8, the equilibriums obtained are :[0.85, 0.05, 0.8, 0],[0.8945, 0.0055, 0, 0.8]and
[0.0055, 0.8945, 0, 0.8], where the only optimal solution is: [0.85, 0.05, 0.8, 0].
C. 2xcr ≤ x1 + x2 ≤ 3xcr
For the third case, we take x1 = .95 and x2 = .9. The equilibriums obtained are:
[0.8904, 0.0096, 0.8808, 0.0692], [0.8904, 0.0096, 0.0596, 0.8904]
and[0.0692, 0.8308, 0.0596, 0.8904]. All of them constitute the optimal solution and
all three links are active.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we presented initial results of our studies on identifying the convergence
region of gradient descent type controllers in problems that have non-convex objective
functions. We characterized the regions of convergence to different equilibria under
when considering prices based on marginal costs, and showed that performance can
be poor in some cases. We also considered the case of cost plus delay in such systems,
and similarly characterized the convergence regions. We also characterized the re-
gions of convergence using Shapley value for cost functions of power and showed that
through appropriate choice of Shapley weights, we can increase the region of optimal
convergence. A future extension of this work could be to find an optimal scheme to
choose the correct weights for the multi-link cases as well as to apply the same for a
general cost function with delay.
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